MITIGATION: ENTERING THE SECOND WEEK WITH LOW EXPECTATIONS
The first week of negotiations on the Mitigation Work Programme concluded in Belém with little progress and even less ambition. A few days ago, we analyzed the key points of the first circulated draft, which was followed by a second draft – an informal note written by the co-facilitators attempting to address all the concerns raised by the various delegations.
With time almost up and now looking toward a referral to the ministerial dialogue in the second week of COP, the co-facilitators asked the delegations present for their views on the text. What followed was a repetition of entrenched positions, with occasional pushes forward (or, more often, backward) from some countries.
Saudi Arabia (supported by Zimbabwe) raised the stakes by requesting the removal from the draft of any reference to the “need for urgent action and support to keep the 1.5°C goal still within reach” (paragraph 6 of the current Preamble). Sharp responses followed, particularly from New Zealand and the Pacific island countries (on behalf of the AOSIS group), who reaffirmed the centrality of science and the maintenance of Paris language in the texts. China also took the floor to call for greater alignment with the language of the Agreement in drafting the text, but for different reasons – it was referring to another paragraph, paragraph 4, which is currently formulated in an objectively awkward way: “Reaffirms the Paris temperature goal,” without any detail.
We then witnessed a dispute that will carry over into the second week, and which has deep roots. Colombia explicitly requested that the entire decision be textually linked, in several points and in a clear and linear manner, to the two parallel decisions on the UAE Dialogue on the Global Stocktake and the second Global Stocktake. Saudi Arabia strongly opposed this, arguing that the Paris Agreement does not provide any mechanism for implementing the Global Stocktakes beyond countries’ NDCs, and therefore there is no mandate to link the Mitigation Work Programme process to future Stocktakes. Yet another skirmish over the mandate of this table, as already seen last year in Baku.
Regarding the “Improvements” section (of the process), the European Union suggested removing references and prescriptive instructions from the COP directed at the Boards of the Green Climate Fund, the Green Environmental Facility, and other UN bodies and initiatives, as these are objectively beyond the mandate of the Working Group. Lengthy discussions then followed on the passage stating that the Working Group should have a “matchmaking function” i.e., a role in supporting the connection between funding demand and supply for implementation – a formulation that most delegations found unappealing.
The debate on the possible Platform, to be launched as a concrete outcome of the Working Group, continues to dominate discussions. In the absence of more tangible outputs, the virtual Platform would serve as an online connector between national climate platforms and multilateral financial institutions. Strong opposition came from AOSIS countries and Japan, who see no added value in such a tool. Caught in the middle, China proposed a third Option – Option 3, to be drafted – between Option 1 (launch the Platform) and Option 2 (do not launch it) in order to find a compromise.
What, ultimately, will become of the Working Group after 2026? The discussion on renewing its mandate continued in the room, with India firmly opposing any extension – it is worth noting here that, in parallel and outside the room, the Brazilian COP30 Presidency is working on a mitigation roadmap which, regardless of its concrete outcome, would constitute a potential duplicate of the Working Group if launched.
All countries eventually agreed to forward the current (and contentious) informal note to Ministers for the second week, fully aware of the existence of this dual track.
Cover image: photo by CAN International.