20
Nov

WHO DECIDES, AND HOW, AT CLIMATE CONFERENCES?

In Antalya, Parties debated how to make climate conferences work better. As far back as 2011, Mexico and Papua New Guinea proposed voting as a last resort. Following the contested Doha plenary in 2012, Russia and Belarus requested formal discussions on how consensus is determined. No new rules are emerging from COP31. On voting, the Presidency proposed resuming talks at COP32. On the decision-making process itself, Parties even split over the terms of deferral, triggering “Rule 16.”

When we recount the final night of a COP, the fall of the gavel usually marks the end of the story. The Presidency declares a text adopted, and from that moment on, we can state what governments have decided on climate change. Far less often do we tell the story of the minutes leading up to that gesture. How long have delegations held the text in their hands? Have they had time to discuss it among themselves? And if a country asks for the floor just as the Presidency is about to declare an agreement, who stops to listen?

To understand why this receives so little attention, one need only look at what happens at the opening of every COP. Under Article 7 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Parties were supposed to adopt their rules of procedure at their very first conference. In Berlin, in 1995, governments agreed to apply them provisionally while leaving in abeyance Rule 42 of the draft Rules of Procedure—the provision governing voting. Ever since, Parties have returned to the issue at every COP and, for more than thirty years, have maintained the exact same practice: deferring the matter to the following year.

How, then, is a decision taken? For the vast majority of negotiating decisions, COPs operate by consensus, in line with standard United Nations practice. The presiding officer proposes the adoption of a text and checks whether there are any formal objections. Unlike a unanimous vote, no one has to tally a “yes” from every country. A delegation may hold even deep reservations, ask for them to be recorded in the minutes, and still allow the decision to pass. That is why the exact moment a delegation is given the floor matters so much.

In Doha, in 2012, the Russian delegation was given the floor only after the decision had already been adopted. The plenary was approving the package containing the amendment for the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine had requested to speak on a text concerning, among other things, the fate of unused emission allowances from the first period. The Qatari Presidency brought down the gavel. When finally allowed to speak, the Russian delegate challenged both the substance of the decision and the procedure by which it had been adopted. The protest was entered into the official record—with the decision already adopted.

The dispute had repercussions the very next year. At the Bonn intersessional talks, Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine asked the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) to discuss decision-making procedures. The clash over adding the item prevented the body from even adopting its own agenda. At COP19 in Warsaw, the issue made it onto the COP agenda, and it has reappeared several times since, only to be deferred to the subsequent session—just as happened at COP30 in Belém.

Following Belém, the Secretariat compiled an information note containing practical guidance for presiding officers. Recommendations included giving countries sufficient time to read draft texts, notifying them in advance if multiple decisions are to be presented together, and, where possible, displaying the speakers’ list visibly in the plenary hall. In Antalya, AILAC asked the Presidency whether this guidance is actually being applied in plenary and proposed that the final COP decision take note of it. Tuvalu, meanwhile, called for a formal process to review and endorse those guidelines.

Alongside this track, the Presidency also opened an informal table not on the formal agenda: consultations on strengthening the UNFCCC process, presented by the Australian Presidency in response to an invitation from the Subsidiary Body for Implementation. Here the question is broader: how can a COP be organised so that all countries are able to shape decisions? For Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and Least Developed Countries (LDCs), part of the answer starts with scheduling. When three negotiating rooms run simultaneously, a small delegation has to choose which room to make its voice heard in.

Hence the proposal to cluster related agenda items—a delicate balance to strike. Splitting negotiations into dedicated tracks allows Parties to address the complexity of climate change. Measuring progress on adaptation, preparing national plans, and mobilising resources to implement them are interconnected issues, yet each demands specific expertise, time, and political attention. Grouping them together could help a smaller delegation follow all of them. At the same time, it risks letting disagreement on one issue block the others, or causing a priority for the most vulnerable countries to lose visibility. For this reason, the Maldives called for exploring ways to cluster work while safeguarding individual mandates.

Tensions surfaced within the consultation itself. Precisely because the track lacked a formal negotiating mandate, the Arab Group repeatedly asked the Presidency how it intended to use the interventions made in the room: would they feed into a summary report, a new proposal for further debate, or directly into the final political cover decision? Many delegations, it pointed out, were busy elsewhere closing other negotiations at that very moment. Fiji likewise asked to review and comment on any draft text before it reached the plenary. The Presidency committed to reporting back on next steps.

Yesterday, the picture became clearer. The EU, the UK, Canada, New Zealand, the EIG, AILAC, and the LDCs want to move forward through a high-level track, written submissions from Parties, and analysis by the Secretariat—with some calling for this to be anchored in the final decision. By contrast, Russia, the Arab Group, the LMDCs, the African Group, Egypt, Argentina, South Africa, Iran, and the UAE reject any new process and want to return the discussion to the SBI agenda item on arrangements for intergovernmental meetings in June. Brazil proposed taking the conversation outside formal channels, using informal retreats and practical experimentation before changing any rules. The topic had already appeared in the first draft of the cover decision (paragraphs 136–138), where the Arab Group expressed surprise at seeing it included, while Russia warned it would accept nothing on the matter in the text. The second draft, circulated on Thursday afternoon, retains it across two paragraphs (74–75), outlining a slower, more technical pathway: no high-level consultations, but rather a dialogue convened by the Chairs of the Subsidiary Bodies in 2027 and 2028, informed by a Secretariat report presenting options to strengthen a “consensus-based, Party-driven” process, with conclusions expected at COP34. The co-chairs of the consultations will simply report back to the Presidency.

On the agenda item dedicated to the Rules of Procedure, the most concrete proposal came from the Brazilian COP30 Presidency. The idea was to make the provisional application of the rules automatic, while preserving the right of Parties to reopen the discussion upon request—thereby sparing conferences a recurring procedural consultation every single year. For Tuvalu, however, that annual appointment holds vital political value: faced with deadlocks across multiple negotiating tracks, the small island state wants to keep open the space to discuss when voting could be used.

Mexico recalled a proposal it had submitted jointly with Papua New Guinea back in 2011, prior to the Doha crisis. The two countries sought to amend the Convention to allow—once all efforts at consensus had been exhausted—a vote by a three-quarters majority of Parties present and voting, with carve-outs for certain financial matters. However, the Presidency clarified that this proposal falls under a separate agenda item—on amendments to the Convention—which remains in abeyance. In Antalya, the Arab Group and the African Group defended consensus as the sole legitimate path; for the African Group, changing the rules would mean opening “Pandora’s box.” Tuvalu, Chile, and the rest of AILAC instead urged keeping the discussion open, a stance the European Union eventually backed. Ultimately, the COP30 Presidency’s proposal to automate the procedure failed to secure consensus, and the Presidency proposed revisiting the item at COP32.

On the second track—dedicated to how consensus is ascertained in the room—it was Russia that tabled a draft text. Moscow called for clarity on how presiding officers should manage requests for the floor, handle objections, and determine when a decision can be adopted, citing among its examples the adoption of the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance (NCQG) in Baku in 2024. The European Union would have preferred to close this agenda item and continue the discussion under the SBI item on arrangements for intergovernmental meetings, whereas Russia, Belarus, and the Arab Group insisted it retain its own dedicated space. Tuvalu, backed by Chile, proposed inviting written submissions ahead of COP32 to examine both the Russian proposal and the guidance prepared after Belém.

In the end, Parties even divided over how to defer the discussion. The EU was prepared to accept the usual procedural conclusion. Russia insisted that the deferral explicitly record the proposals tabled in Antalya and rejected that standard formula. It also complained that the Presidency had devoted more time to its own unmandated initiatives than to a formal agenda item—a criticism it repeated on Thursday in the consultations on strengthening the process. The Presidency therefore applied Rule 16 of the UNFCCC draft Rules of Procedure, which automatically carries over any unfinished item onto the provisional agenda of the next COP. At COP32, Parties will thus return to debating who gets to speak before the gavel falls. No new rules for presiding officers are emerging from Antalya, nor an agreed mandate for intersessional work—yet at long last, the conversation has begun.

On Thursday, Panama (a member of AILAC) went even further: in an open letter to the Presidencies, it called for decisions to be taken by simple majority whenever consensus proves unattainable, warning that it will otherwise formally object to the adoption of decisions.

Article by Anna Pelicci, Head of Delegation for Italian Climate Network at COP31 in Antalya.

Cover image: UN Climate Change – Kiara Worth

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