MITIGATION WORK PROGRAMME STILL UNDER THREAT
A new draft significantly narrows down the open options, yet the core issues have now been handed over to ministers. The duration of the Programme and its relationship with the Second Global Stocktake remain the main points of friction—and this has a great deal to do with how the UNFCCC operates. Sacrificing the Mitigation Work Programme at the eleventh hour on the altar of a stronger cover decision on other fronts would be a historic mistake for this COP.
Negotiations on the Mitigation Work Programme continued at the start of the second week, following the release of two negotiating drafts during the first. Politically unresolved options—those sections of the decision where countries had yet to reach agreement and which were therefore placed in brackets—had surged from 40 in the very first draft to 177 in the second over the weekend. We now have a new iteration, with political sticking points reduced—so to speak—to 66 passages, which nonetheless encompass all the core issues: in particular, Parties still cannot agree on the duration of the Programme once renewed (four years, or five?), nor on its relationship with the pathway leading up to the Second Global Stocktake in 2028.
Both questions have now been elevated to ministerial consultations.
Initially proposed by Switzerland and backed by the European Union and the United Kingdom, the idea of establishing a permanent expert committee to support the process (mirroring those already in place for the workstreams on finance and adaptation) appears to have definitively sunk—and was likely floated from the outset as one of the possible sacrificial lambs of these negotiations to secure a compromise package. In previous bulletins and briefings, however, we underscored not only the need to establish such a support body, but also the political opportunity for several European governments—not least Italy, which consistently contributes high-calibre experts, often in key roles, to UN/UNFCCC advisory bodies of this kind—to push in that direction.
Yet many of you have asked us in recent days: why should a work programme that has delivered next to nothing over four years, paralysed by mutual vetoes, matter so much? And why, if the Programme has proved so toothless thus far, are certain countries—first and foremost China—fighting so fiercely against its continuation, investing substantial time and political capital in the negotiating room?
The first part of the answer lies in the importance of dedicated spaces for thematic dialogue in a deeply fragmented geopolitical landscape. To date, the Mitigation Work Programme represents the only formal arena where countries are called upon to discuss methods and ideas to address the collective inadequacy of their national climate plans, the NDCs. It is a space worth safeguarding ahead of the Second Global Stocktake, which will precede and (in theory) inform the drafting of the next round of NDCs due in 2030, covering the 2030–2040 period. Should international climate ambition experience an unexpected surge between 2027 and 2028—whether through peace or a truce in Ukraine, or a political shift in the White House—having an existing forum to discuss mitigation will be vastly different from having to build one from scratch.
The second part of the answer concerns the central role of the principle of “Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities” (CBDR-RC)—the political cornerstone of the 1992 UN Climate Convention and later the Paris Agreement—which essentially bars interference or sanctions in other countries’ domestic climate affairs, while underscoring historical roles and responsibilities in the climate crisis. Many emerging economies fear that Western nations could use the Work Programme to impose new targets or punitive measures on them, running counter to the “bottom-up spirit of Paris” and the strictly sovereign, nationally determined nature of climate planning in a multipolar multilateral system.
How will it end? While there appears to be broad agreement on renewing the Programme (though, as noted, not on its duration), we are watching the process with cautious vigilance: as always at COPs, during the final 70 hours of negotiations, individual agenda items can end up either enshrined or sacrificed as bargaining chips in a broader political package. These dynamics are unfolding rapidly right now inside high-level ministerial consultations closed to observers. Nevertheless, as we stated last week, for us at Italian Climate Network the cancellation—formally, the non-renewal—of the Mitigation Work Programme would arguably represent the worst possible outcome of this COP.
Article by the Italian Climate Network delegation at COP31 in Antalya.
Cover image: UN Climate Change – Kiara Worth
