COP30: THE PRESIDENCY’S ATTEMPT TO KEEP EVERYONE ON BOARD

• Consultations by the Brazilian Presidency continue on four topics left off the agenda.
• We are facing a gap in implementation and ambition in the Nationally Determined Contributions.
• Possible solutions on how to move forward have emerged, but convergence still seems distant

In parallel with all negotiation tracks, at COP30 the Brazilian Presidency has been holding intensive consultations. The focus is on four points proposed by some Parties for inclusion in the agenda (we list them here as indicated in the Presidency’s summary):

• Implementation of Article 9, paragraph 1, of the Paris Agreement
• Promoting international cooperation and addressing the concerns with climate change related trade-restrictive unilateral measures
• Responding to the synthesis report on nationally determined contributions and addressing the 1.5 °C ambition and implementation gap
• Reporting and review pursuant to Article 13 of the Paris Agreement: Synthesis of biennial transparency reports

The consultations were proposed as a way to avoid a possible deadlock in adopting the agenda. As the most attentive will recall, some of these issues have already come up in the past. In Bonn last June, the adoption of the agenda was delayed for two days precisely because of attempts to include border carbon adjustment policies (read: CBAM) and the financial obligations of developed countries towards developing countries (Article 9.1).Two new proposals have now been added to these topics: responding to the findings from the Biennial Transparency Reports and from the latest Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). We are, in fact, facing two gaps: an implementation gap and an ambition gap. From the 100 Biennial Transparency Reports submitted by Parties, representing 69% of global emissions in 2021, it emerges that we are moving toward implementing the first two NDCs, although probably too slowly to meet the targets promised for 2025 and 2030. And this is the implementation gap.

On the other hand, the new NDCs, which set a target for 2035, lack the necessary ambition: if fully implemented, they would lead to only a 12% reduction in emissions by 2035 compared to 2019 levels. This figure considers only the NDCs that are already public (representing 69% of global emissions) and the targets of the previous U.S. administration.

The Global Stocktake tells us, in line with science, that in order to limit global warming to 1.5°C, with limited or no overshoot, global greenhouse gas emissions must decrease by 60% by 2035 compared to 2019. This is where the ambition gap comes from.

On Monday, there was a clear sense of urgency in the room to find an agreement. However, at the moment, a convergence still seems far off.

Implementation of Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement

For developing countries, the financial goal defined in Baku—the New Collective Quantified Goal on climate finance (NCQG)—does not cover Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement, which therefore still needs to be operationalized. Article 9.1, which establishes the obligation for developed countries to provide financial resources to assist developing countries in mitigation and adaptation, is not explicitly mentioned in the text of the financial goal, which instead falls under the broader umbrella of Article 9. This omission is being used as a basis to insist more clearly on discussing public finance provided by developed countries.

In this regard, the Like-Minded Developing Countries have proposed launching a three-year work programme on the implementation of Article 9.1. For the Arab Group, an action plan is necessary to implement Article 9.1, with clear methodologies for counting financial flows and for burden sharing. Many developing countries agree: “we cannot leave Belém without resolving Article 9.1.”

For developed countries, on the other hand, it is important to emphasize that the NCQG does implement Article 9.1, as it includes both public resources and private resources mobilized from public sources in developed countries. The discussion should therefore focus on how to fully implement the decision made in Baku. From their perspective, focusing solely on Article 9.1 does not allow for discussion of other important elements, which are correctly reflected in the NCQG—such as access, the balance between mitigation and adaptation, and the quality of resources.

Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism 

For developing countries, carbon border adjustment measures, including the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), do not respect the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, as defined in the Paris Agreement. These measures do not take into account the origin of imported products but apply indiscriminately to both developed and developing countries. According to a UNCTAD report frequently cited in the room, the introduction of CBAM would lead to a reduction in revenues for developing countries of USD 5.9 billion, assuming a carbon price of USD 44 per ton, while CO₂ emissions would decrease by only 0.1%.

Moreover, the implementation of these measures would increase revenues for developed countries, effectively reversing financial flows: instead of being directed from developed to developing countries, as defined by their financial obligations, the flows would go in the opposite direction.

Some options on the table include: holding discussions on the impacts of climate policies under the “response measures” track; creating working groups on the nexus between climate change and trade in 2026 and 2027, using them as input for the second Global Stocktake; operationalizing Article 3.5 of the Convention, which states that Parties should cooperate to promote an open and supportive international economic system; and creating a platform to understand the impacts of these measures on developing countries beyond their borders.

Article by Claudia Concaro, delegate of Italian Climate Network at COP30 in Belém.

Cover image: photo by Rafa Neddermeyer/COP30 Brasil Amazônia/PR