COP29, FULL ANALYSIS BY ITALIAN CLIMATE NETWORK
After two weeks of difficult negotiations and high tensions, many extra hours were needed to finally close COP29. Tight hours, with delegations locked in the room even at night to discuss agreements that eventually arrived, albeit amidst strong dissatisfaction over the final texts and backward steps on science and mitigation.
Climate finance was the centerpiece around which every other topic discussed here in Baku revolved. In the end an agreement was reached. The previous global climate finance target, which sought to mobilise $100 billion dollars a year to developing countries by 2025, is replaced by a double target, which pledges to mobilise financial resources to at least $300 billion a year by 2035, with industrialised countries in the leading role, as part of a broader global and multi-actor increase in climate finance that will aim to mobilise at least $1,300 billion a year by 2035.
With regard to the commitments mainly on the part of industrialised countries, the figures are therefore far removed from those demanded by developing countries and civil society, but above all by the most vulnerable communities that are already facing the most catastrophic effects of the climate crisis despite being only minimally responsible for it. At the same time, the overall mobilisation commitment of $1.3 trillion a year represents a significant political step forward on the part of developed countries – indeed, only a month ago talk of trillions seemed like political fiction.
Bittersweet feelings and disappointments were also felt on other issues. First and foremost that of mitigation, relating to the measures needed to limit the rise in temperatures to within 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels: reference to this crucial threshold has even disappeared from the text. Similarly, the first COP following the Global Stocktake of the exit from fossil fuels seems to have forgotten about that “transitioning away” that only a year ago had partially kept the global ambition alive, until the nightly collapse of the texts on the very implementation of the GST, resoundingly postponed to 2025.
Let’s go directly to the point with the analysis by the Italian Climate Network, who followed the twenty-ninth Conference of the Parties directly from the halls in Baku, and let’s see on which topics of negotiations steps ahead – and behind – have been taken.
Finance, the New Collective Quantitative Goal (NCQG) 2025-2035
The previous financial target of $100 billion per year for developing countries is expanded to at least $300 billion per year by 2035, in mobilised public and private finance, with developed countries in the leading role. This formulation leaves the possibility of including, without any obligation but instead with an encouragement, the contributions of countries with high emissions or contributing capacity (China, South Korea, OPEC countries in the Gulf), not included among the developed countries in the UN Climate Convention.
The final agreement also stipulates that by 2035 at least $1.3 trillion per year will be mobilised globally, taking into account all private and public sources and – according to an unusual formula for treaty terminology – ‘all actors’.
The financial resources mobilised at the international level towards developing countries will have to finance the aid-conditional part of the climate plans under the Paris Agreement, i.e. the NDCs, of the countries of the global South, in addition to their national adaptation plans and related communications to the UN, as well as other smaller plans and policies.
The Baku text also calls for a significant increase in public resources for adaptation funds (Adaptation Fund, Least Developed Countries Fund, Special Climate Change Fund) and at least a tripling of resource outflows to the funds in 2030, compared to the 2022 level. Here too, the absence of the reference to developed countries alone as contributors leaves room for the inclusion of developing countries.
In order to shed light on the achievement of the outermost layer of the financial target, that of $1.3 trillion annually, a roadmap from Baku to Belém is launched: it will also seek to increase climate finance in the form of concessions, concessional instruments and measures for the creation of fiscal space for sustainable development and the implementation of climate plans of developing countries.
For what concerns rights and climate justice, there is only a generic mention of the principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities in the preamble. No mention of a real right of access to climate finance for the most vulnerable communities, duly listed but in the context of increasing and extending their benefits. A weak text even in this respect.
In a context where not even on this historic occasion has a definition of climate finance been clarified (but, as we have seen, only of its destination), the COP thus fails to provide the world with a new goal that matches the immediate expectations of the most fragile countries, but finds a compromise, upon which now it must be built. Barring political forcing, this decision will remain in force for the next ten years.
The implementation of the Global Stocktake (GST)
The work on the 2023 Global Stocktake has been divided in three negotiating tables at COP29.
The first, procedural and logistical elements of the process, focused on assessing the effectiveness of NDCs in the global mitigation context, with particular attention to the available science. Some countries, led by Saudi Arabia, have sought to reduce the role of the IPCC by proposing the use of other scientific sources. This distrust of the IPCC is recurring, as proven by a similar proposal by Russia in Bonn. Furthermore, some countries are calling for an IPCC report before GST2 in 2028, while others believe that forcing science to keep pace with politics may be harmful. In the end, the text was not approved and the whole package was sent back to the intersessional negotiations for further discussion.
The second table, the annual Global Stocktake dialogue, ended without any concrete decisions. Held in Bonn in June, the dialogue saw countries and stakeholders discuss the implementation of NDCs and international cooperation. Countries had to decide whether to continue these meetings in the coming years and whether to include them in future NDCs. Although all parties expressed satisfaction with the work done, developing countries consider the mandate concluded. Despite lengthy negotiations, no decisive conclusions emerged and Rule 16 was applied at this table, thus postponing it to the next negotiations.
The third negotiation, the UAE dialogue on the Global Stocktake, was the most complex, focusing on how to translate the results of the first stocktake (GST1) into concrete national actions, inviting countries to increase ambition in the next NDCs. Initially, the dialogue was included in the section on climate finance, but it was decided to adopt a holistic approach that would include not only the assessment of collective progress, but also financing, as requested by the EU. However, the dialogue will be limited until 2026, as requested by the G77. Organisationally, the dialogues will be held annually in Bonn, structured in two half-day sessions, with a portal to gather input from countries and stakeholders. Furthermore, the reference to an ‘annual global progress report’ was removed in the final text in favour of a reaffirmation of the role of transition fuels. Finally, it was discussed whether a report of the dialogues should be drawn up, but some countries objected. This stalled the consensus around this dialogue, which was not approved and therefore postponed to the intersessional negotiations.
Mitigation Work Programme (MWP)
Mitigation is one of the crucial topics at climate COPs, or at least it should be. Instead, at this COP it represented one of the biggest negotiating failures of the year, after two weeks of silence in the halls.
The 2024 Emissions Gap Report released just before COP29 by UNEP sent an alarming signal by clearly showing that, with the current national commitments included in the NDCs, the best we can expect is catastrophic global warming of up to 2.6°C over the course of the century. Despite these premises, the two weeks of COP29 saw a continuous stalemate and blockage of mitigation discussions, imposed by China (followed by the entire Like-Minded Developing Countries negotiating group), Saudi Arabia (and the entire Arab Countries negotiating group) and African countries. These countries have repeatedly stated that they do not want to accept targets imposed from above or from other countries. For this reason, the final text of the Sharm el-Sheikh mitigation ambition and implementation work programme (MWP) lacks any reference to a rapid and substantial reduction in greenhouse gas emissions.
Furthermore, there is no reference in the text to moving away from fossil fuels, nor to ‘transition away from fossil fuel’ as decided at COP28; containment of the global average temperature increase (within 1.5°C or at least 2°C) and peak emissions are never mentioned. Last year at COP28 there was discussion of reaching peak emissions before 2025; at COP29 there is no reference to 2025 or any other year – the peak is simply never mentioned in the final decision.
Not only that, the text does not define concrete actions or commitments to reduce emissions and achieve climate neutrality by 2050. No trace of key words such as fossil fuel, phase out, transition, NDCs and renewable energy.
A generic reduction of operational emissions (from heating, cooling and household appliances), the design of energy-efficient building coats (for renovations and new construction), the reduction of embedded emissions (in building materials), low-carbon spatial planning and infrastructure, electrification and switching to sources from clean and low-emission technologies, and the improvement of carbon storage through green and blue infrastructure are addressed.
The ‘importance of international collaboration and means of implementation, including finance, technology transfer, capacity-building, knowledge-sharing and awareness-raising, for urgently scaling up implementation of mitigation actions, particularly in developing countries’ is explicitly mentioned.
The creation of a digital platform to facilitate the implementation of mitigation actions is considered to improve collaboration between governments, funders and other stakeholders for project development. Finally, the topics to be discussed in the 2025 ‘dialogues’ must be presented by 1 February 2025, subsequently decided and communicated by 1 March 2025. Overall, however, we are facing a bold step backwards compared to COP28. In words and in content.
Global Goal on Adaptation
No more than 100 indicators for reporting, with flexible options for each country based on objective local circumstances. This concludes one of the most complex negotiations at COP29, which saw Parties confront each other in lengthy technical sessions.
The indicators will help countries measure progress towards the adaptation targets set out in the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) using both an incremental and transformative approach. In this context, additional indicators that can be applied include those on ecosystems and those aimed at encompassing social inclusion, indigenous people, participatory processes, human rights, young people and people with disabilities. There is also positive news: the Parties have reinstated the mention of gender equality and migrants, which in previous working drafts, as we had pointed out, did not appear.
Added to the list of indicators are also factors that increase the likelihood of successful adaptation measures: these include technology transfer, capacity-building, and the importance of timing, feasibility and access to finance for adaptation. Finally, the creation of the Baku Adaptation Road Map to continue work on the GGA is established, as the importance of the best available scientific knowledge and the role of the IPCC in informing the process is reaffirmed.
Article 6 and carbon markets
We knew that COP29 would also be the Article 6 COP. The Presidency itself had announced the closing of the package (almost 10 years after Paris) during the past Bonn intersessional negotiations. It seemed like a mission impossible but the decisions have indeed come and they concern both bilateral cooperation between countries (Article 6.2) and the Paris Agreement Credit Mechanism (new name and new acronym, PACM). There has been no shortage of protests from civil society over texts deemed weak due to the absence of sufficient guarantees on the credibility of the mitigation contribution of the credits issued and on the protection of human rights in the projects that will be selected and financed, given the bad experiences of the last decade.
At the start of the COP, on the first day, the plenary adopted a proposal by the President that took note of the work done by the Article 6.4 Supervisory Body, which, as an extension of its original mandate, had already adopted in October the minimum methodologies for new credits and a specific methodology for carbon removal projects, as well as the Sustainable Development Tool (an ex-ante assessment of each new project on the basis of the Sustainable Development Goals), completing a package that had already seen the innovative grievance tool for affected populations adopted during the year.
Specifically, the methodology that was adopted structures the (historical) starting points, which are the basis for calculating the mitigation contribution, according to a downward trajectory over time (‘downwarding adjustment’), although civil society points out that the calculation methodologies may not be so stringent or precise.
Regarding carbon removals from the atmosphere, the new methodology provides for liability clauses for developers in the case of avoidable project failure, with a new approach requiring all developers to compulsorily create potential additional credits, not to be marketed, to be used only in the case of replacement: this approach regulates the sector at last, but it has not convinced the developer community. Interestingly, under the new methodology a project can be immediately suspended as soon as a stakeholder signals a potential technical failure of the project. Finally, there are flexibility clauses in development and reporting for developing countries.
Regarding Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement in its interaction with Article 6.4, the hot topic at the COP was registries. In the world of carbon credits, both in the voluntary market and in national systems, there are registries that collect key data on projects and traded credits. Many actors, in particular the European Union, had for years wanted the COP to establish a single, binding UN registry under Article 6 for all credits issued and traded, but such a solution was always strongly opposed by the United States, which preferred deregulation. The final decision taken in Baku is a compromise: the new UN registry will be created, but it will be rather light and somewhat passive, and data from other existing registries will be reported in it according to an ‘open and see’ approach. Only in case of need (as there are no national registries) will developing countries be able to request active support from the UN in registering their transactions in the UN registry.
Mixed reactions, as we said. Palpable enthusiasm in the room after nine years of negotiations, but also among project developers and stakeholders in the voluntary market, who now see the possibility of new and expected convergence (and thus development opportunities) towards the new UN system.
Lastly, CAN points out a flaw from a human rights perspective: the text adopted in Baku says nothing about a possible ban under the new system on projects that openly violate the human rights of the communities involved. Human rights are never mentioned in the entire text.
Transparency
Parties to the Paris Agreement are required to submit Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs) every two years, with the first submission due by 31 December 2024. At COP29, the aim was to ensure that all Parties were ready to submit their Reports.
Two operational workshops were held in Baku to provide support to Parties in the final stages of BTR preparation, with individual assistance and targeted support for three modules: GHG inventory, progress on Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), and support for common tabular formats.
Biennial Transparency Reports include information on: national inventory reports; progress towards NDCs; policies and measures, impacts and adaptation to climate change; levels of financial support, technology development and transfer, and capacity building needs and areas for improvement. Small Island Developing States and Least Developed Countries may submit the required information for the report at their discretion.
To submit the required information for the Biennial Transparency Report, the ETF Reporting Tools application is used, which can only be accessed by nominated national compilers via a specific submission portal. In Baku, prior to COP29, the Azerbaijani Presidency also launched the Baku Global Climate Transparency Platform initiative, which should increase support for developing countries.
Just Transition
Discussions on the Just Transition Programme were intense, with developing countries demanding more financial support and respect for the principle of differentiated responsibility. The programme aims to develop strategies to counter rising temperatures by promoting sustainable development, with a special focus on workers. However, developing countries criticised the final draft as insufficient without concrete commitments. Disagreements mainly concerned the scope of application: developed countries preferred national policies, while the G77 supported an international and cooperative approach. The issue of financing remained crucial, with a call for a dedicated fund for transitions in vulnerable countries.
In the text, human rights were only mentioned in the preamble, recalling the Paris Agreement. A positive point is the emphasis on community participation in decision-making processes. However, even this negotiating table failed to reach consensus and the issue and was postponed to the intermediate negotiations in Bonn.
Gender policies and rights
After an uphill start – with Arab countries, the Holy See and Russia contesting the use of crucial terms in the text on the Gender Work Programme – it seems that countries have finally found some common ground. The final text of COP29, in fact, keeps the word ‘gender’, the most relevant to this transversal field of work in the UNFCCC. Critical points remain, in particular the absence of the terms ‘intersectionality’ (replaced with ‘multidimensionality’, which is less technical) and ‘diversity’, especially with reference to women; there is also, unfortunately, a lack of recognition of the protection of women environmental activists. Then, among the decisions referred to, paradoxically any mention of the Paris Agreement has disappeared: in addition to being a milestone in the climate negotiations, it was the first text to mention human rights in the preamble.
Finally, the extension of the Lima Work Programme for another ten years is confirmed, as is the development of a new Gender Action Plan that leaves room for possible future incremental developments on women’s rights.
Towards the next NDCs
This year, the COP should have continued its consideration of further guidance on the characteristics of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). Countries were very divided, not only on the characteristics of the next NDCs (the COP received no less than 39 pages of comments), but also on when to finalise them. After three hypotheses, it was decided that the review will continue in November 2026. Another negative point of COP29, considering that the next NDCs will cover the five-year period from 2031 to 2035.
Biodiversity
The COP29 presidency launched the Rio Trio Initiative to mark the commitment to catalyse coordinated action between the three Rio UN Conventions (climate, biodiversity and desertification), with the aim of addressing the three closely linked global challenges. However, there is a lack of a specific negotiating field on climate and biodiversity (as it also happens on climate and desertification) similar to those established in past years on just transition or agriculture. We have always deemed that creating a shared negotiating agenda between climate change and biodiversity protection is crucial, because these are similar and closely related challenges that cannot be tackled in watertight compartments.
Should the European CBAM be discussed at the COP or not?
The attempt by the BRICS to include a new negotiating item on the European CBAM in the opening plenary of this COP had soon failed, as it did a year ago in Dubai. However, that group of countries, along with many of the G77, did not give up, continuing to propose similar textual options on several tables in an attempt to mainstream around the formula ‘mechanisms implemented to combat climate change that impose unilateral restrictions on international trade’, not far from the ‘unilateral measures’ seen during 2024 in the WTO, UN General Assembly and BRICS. In the final hours of COP29 the point reappeared in the introductory part of the decision on the implementation of the Global Stocktake. The COP decision on the Global Stocktake also stipulates to initiate from June 2025 in Bonn a dialogue on the link between trade and climate change, a point that given the tensions had remained in brackets until the closing plenary. Point for China?
Towards COP30
Against all odds, the Baku COP actually managed to bring home the two key decisions on the new climate finance goal and Article 6. This was by no means a foregone conclusion given the process that, since that Thursday in Dubai a year ago, has brought us here to Baku in a country perhaps not too ready, we thought, to host a multilateral event of this magnitude.
The final decision on the new climate finance goal, as we have seen, disappointed many – but it is there. And it will stand for the next ten years. The Paris Mechanism for Carbon Credits will be able to see the light from 2025 and develop, under the guidance of the Supervisory Body, which will now have to build up its records. Despite the discouragement of a decision on finance that does not do justice to the needs of the most fragile countries exposed to climate change, the Paris Agreement is now truly complete and, with the NCQG, sees the adoption of the second of its key documents for these 2020s after last year’s Global Stocktake and ahead of the next one in 2028. In conclusion, it must be pointed out that the Baku COP solves some key questions for next year’s Belém COP, which will and must address other issues.